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PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Our next distinguished speaker,
Herbert Okun, is a former Ambassador to the United Nations, and to the
former German Republic, and a very special participant in the Yugoslav
crisis. He has also served as a mediator of the controversy between
Greece and Macedonia. After his distinguished career in the foreign
service, he voluntarily took on responsibilities in facilitating
development of the free enterprise system in the former communist
Eastern Bloc countries, the former Soviet republics and in parts of Asia.
We are privileged indeed to have this gentleman who has served so ably
and enthusiastically. I ask you to give him a very warm welcome.
AMBASSADOR OKUN: Thank you, Professor Del Duca. Good
morning, ladies and gentlemen.
Of all the issues surrounding international criminal justice, none is
more contentious than the arguments involving the related issues of
peace and reconciliation on the one hand and justice and accountability
on the other. Even the manner in which the problem is posed is open to
dispute. Shall we speak of peace and justice, or is the problem better
posed as peace or justice? These are not merely terminological minutiae.
The fact is that even in its broadest, least contentious formulation, there
can be a dilemma between the competing demands of peace and justice.
2007]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Growth of International Justice
The problem is hardly new. Every system of justice, every
philosopher of ethics has wrestled with it. What is relatively new is that
international criminal justice and law have come increasingly to grapple
with these dilemmas as international justice has grown and developed,
particularly in the last two decades since the end of the Cold War.
From Impunity to Accountability of Leaders
Today I would like to examine some of the conundrums generated
by these issues. In doing so, we will look at some specific cases to see if
valid conclusions can be drawn. In the modern era, impunity for leaders
tended to be the operating principle. Napoleon, after all, died on St.
Helena and not on the gallows or under the guillotine. The dangers faced
by leaders, military and civilian alike, who engaged in armed conflict
ended with the end of hostilities. That began to change, however, in the
twentieth century.
Post World War I
At the end of World War I, the victorious Allied powers sought to
put alleged war criminals on trial. The Versailles Treaty of 1919, in
Article 228, actually demanded that the German government recognize
the right of Allies, "to bring before military tribunals persons accused of
having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." It
also called for the German authorities to hand over all persons accused
and the main accused person, of course, was former German Emperor,
Kaiser Wilhelm II.
Indeed an international commission was set up in 1919 to propose
and set up the facilities for what was called the High Tribunal-
composed of judges drawn from many nations. The Allies also
demanded that the Dutch Government hand over the Kaiser, since he had
fled to the Netherlands after his abdication. The Dutch Government,
however, refused this demand pointing to its neutrality during the war.
In truth, the Allied leaders did not pursue the Kaiser very vigorously
as they had other fish to fry. While the British Prime Minister Lloyd
George did seem interested in bringing the Kaiser to justice, the French
leader Georges Clemenceau was much more interested in squeezing
reparations out of Germany, and Woodrow Wilson was more interested
in setting up a League of Nations. So the idea of an international trial
faded.
It is interesting to note, however, that even then-immediately after
World War I-the United States was skeptical about international justice.
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Foreshadowing future U.S. attitudes, the then Secretary of State Robert
Lansing in 1920 objected to the proposed prosecution of the Kaiser on
the grounds that a chief of state was entitled to immunity and that the
"principle of humanity was too vague to justify a criminal charge."
The Nuremberg Trials
With respect to the Nuremberg Trials and our subject of peace and
justice, it is worth noting that demands of peace with justice were met in
this case. To this day, except for the minuscule neo-Nazi right, the
German public has never disavowed Nuremberg, nor its judgments, nor
have they disavowed the German national trials of their own war
criminals that followed and still continue. The same, however, cannot be
said for Japan.
The project of establishing a system of international justice was
raised very soon after the end of the World War II. A committee of the
United Nations General Assembly actually completed two draft statutes
in 1952 and 1954, but the proposals went nowhere and the idea
slumbered for the next 30 years. In the 1980s, some consideration was
given to the idea of a permanent court to handle international narcotics
trafficking, but that idea also did not progress.
The ICTY
As regards the issue of justice and peace, it was the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that
faced these issues from its inception in 1993. The conflict in the Balkans
was continuing, suspect individuals were very much in evidence, and the
issue of the Tribunal's impartiality was raised, particularly by the
Serbian side. Some observers even charged that the Security Council
had established the Yugoslav Tribunal as a fig leaf to cover up its
unwillingness to intervene militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In any event, the ICTY overcame all these difficulties and its
success has contributed directly to the renewal of serious interest in the
permanent court. The activities of the ICTY, its indictments and trials,
did not hinder in any serious way the negotiators who sought the peace
agreement. I was one of them, and can personally attest to that. Indeed,
the Dayton Framework Agreement, in its Bosnian constitution, implicitly
commended the work of the Tribunal by stipulating that "no person who
is serving a sentence imposed by the ICTY and no person who is under
indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to
appear may stand as a candidate or hold any appointed, elective or other
public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
The issue of the Tribunal's impartiality was resolved positively by
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its indictments and by the exhaustive fairness of the trials themselves. I
have testified in three separate trials in The Hague and could observe the
fairness of the trials.
Individuals from the three warring communities, the Bosnian Serbs,
the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims, have been indicted and
brought to trial in The Hague. We should remember that the Tribunal
was also trying a chief of state for the first time in history when Slobodan
Milogevi6 died in his prison cell. It is also worth noting that, while
Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karad~i6 and General Ratko Mladi6 still
remain at large, two of the three members of the Bosnian Serb
presidency have already been tried and found guilty of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. One pleaded guilty and received a reduced
sentence. The other recently received a sentence of 27 years.
Major cases are still being tried. The Muslim military leader in
Eastern Bosnia is on trial, so are the Serbian Army perpetrators of the
1991 massacre at Vukovar, and the Bosnian Croats, civilian and military,
who were responsible for the ethnic cleansing and worse in central
Bosnia. They all stand now before the bar of justice at the Yugoslav
Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.
Location of the Tribunal
Some persons have raised questions about the Tribunal's location,
distant as it is from the wars of the former Yugoslavia. The argument is
heard that the Tribunal is remote from the peoples of the former
Yugoslavia and that its educative and reconciliation function is thereby
diminished. I do not agree.
Several points can be made in this regard. First, the Tribunal has an
excellent website and anyone with a computer can follow the trials that
are held in open court. Second, while the trials are hardly the stuff of
constant coverage in the Western European and American press, they are
thoroughly reported and commented upon in the involved countries of
the former Yugoslavia. And, finally, the Tribunal has an active outreach
program in those countries.
In addition, it is also worth noting that the Yugoslav Tribunal, like
its sister tribunal for Rwanda, is an ad hoc organization. It had a
beginning and it will come to an end in a couple of years. Pending cases,
and there will surely be some, will be transferred to the relevant national
courts.
In sum, I believe it can be said that the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has powerfully advanced the concept
of peace with justice. History will be the judge, but all indications point
in that direction. In this connection, it is only right and proper that we
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recognize the brilliant pioneering work of the Tribunal's First Chief
Prosecutor, the person who set the Tribunal on its path to success, Judge
Richard Goldstone.
Uganda and the ICC
Turning to Uganda and the International Criminal Court, the
longstanding civil conflict in northern Uganda between the Lord's
Resistance Army [LRA] and the armed forces of the Government in
Kampala offers the clearest window into the dilemmas of reconciliation
and peacemaking on the one hand, and justice and accountability on the
other.
Impunity has become a real issue in the Uganda situation and
resolution is not yet in sight. The basic facts of the conflict may be
summarized briefly and are not in dispute. Almost immediately upon the
accession to power of the administration of President Museveni in 1986,
an insurgency broke out in northern Uganda led by an erratic, brutal
commander, Joseph Kony. The LRA thus has engaged in sporadic
fighting for 20 years.
The warfare has been characterized by gross violations of
international humanitarian law. Credible reports by international
nongovernmental organizations and the media have detailed cases of
abduction of children, forced enlistment in the military, summary
executions, mass rape, torture, forced labor, and mutilations committed
by the LRA. And the behavior of the Ugandan Government's troops has
also been notable for their violations of human rights.
In December 2003, the Ugandan Government referred the LRA
situation to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. To
highlight the referral, which was the first ever by a state party to the ICC,
President Museveni and Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo held a joint press
conference in London in January 2004. That was understandable
because of the novelty, but may not have been the wisest course of
action, since it immediately allowed the prosecutor to be accused of
partiality in the case.
The prosecutor announced the opening of a formal investigation in
July 2004. And one year later, in July 2005, sealed warrants for the
arrest of Joseph Kony and four other LRA leaders were handed down,
accusing them of committing crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The warrants were unsealed in October 2005. In addition, warrants were
also served on the governments of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Uganda; that is to say, warrants to cooperate with the ICC in
apprehending the accused criminals.
There have been many twists and turns in the Ugandan situation in
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this past year, but the essential narrative of the twenty-year conflict has
not changed. Fighting has continued in northern Uganda in spite of
occasional cease fires and truces. Atrocities continue to be committed.
A somewhat fitful peace process has been underway but without much, if
any, success. Despite a flurry of international interest when the referral
to the ICC was announced three years ago, the world's attention has
come to be focused on the humanitarian problems in Darfur. In short,
Uganda, the LRA, and the indictments pending before the ICC are on the
back burner.
In part, this can be explained by the fact that Joseph Kony and his
fellow indictees still remain at large. Unlike the Nuremberg and the
Baghdad Tribunals, but like those of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
the International Criminal Court has no police or military at its disposal
to enforce its arrest warrants. Under the Rome Statute of the ICC, the
states parties to the Statute, in this case Uganda, Congo and Sudan, have
a legal obligation to search for, arrest, and transfer the accused to the
ICC. This obligation, however, has been honored in the breach by all
three states.
Amnesty Not Permitted for Serious International Crimes
Nonetheless, whether because of the indictments, as the prosecutor
would claim, or in spite of them, as many NGOs and others claim,
Joseph Kony and some of his fellow LRA leaders have emerged from the
bush. Another round of peace talks resumed in July 2006 in Juba in
southern Sudan. While the prospects for success are no more promising
than in past peace talks, this time the situation has been complicated by
the LRA leaders' demands for amnesty; and they want the ICC
indictments quashed. Under the Rome Statute establishing the ICC and
in accordance with international law principles, however, amnesty cannot
nullify prosecution for serious international crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity.
It would appear then that the ICC case against Kony and his
accomplices is on a collision course with peace. In addition, President
Museveni of Uganda has muddied the waters further by appearing to
offer amnesty to the LRA leaders if they sign a peace accord and end
their rebellion. Hence an impasse seems to have developed, which has
led most concerned parties to speak out on the dilemma of peace or
justice.
Some examples: South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu took a
middle road stating, "ultimately it is the Ugandans who have to decide
what is best for them. Whatever they choose, it should not hinder
reconciliation and healing and yet it should not encourage impunity and
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hurt the victims yet again." Most outside observers, however, have come
down either on the side of accountability and justice, or peace and
reconciliation.
Humanitarian NGO Position in Amnesty
The humanitarian NGOs working in Uganda generally favor some
form of amnesty, arguing that the first priority has to be to relieve the
decades-long suffering of innocent people. They believe the correct
procedure should be peace first, then justice. The British Ambassador to
the UN has supported them. Other NGOs, including major international
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International,
are of the strong opinion that the ICC case against Kony and company
should proceed without hindrance.
Human Rights Watch Case for Justice
In a report issued in July of 2006 entitled "Uganda: No Amnesty for
Atrocities-Turning a Blind Eye to Justice Undermines Durable Peace,"
Human Rights Watch put forward the case for justice. First, Human
Rights Watch noted that the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has observed that "amnesties cannot be granted for serious crimes
under international law and peace agreements endorsed by the United
Nations can never provide such amnesties." HRW also drew attention to
the situation in southern Sudan, pointing out that the peace agreement
that settled the war in southern Sudan in January 2005 did not include
any amnesty.
Human Rights Watch also cited the failure of amnesties to solve the
belligerency in Sierra Leone, noting that in 1999 the rebel leader there,
Foday Sankoh, who was responsible for a multitude of atrocities, was
granted amnesty. Indeed, he was rewarded with control of a government
commission in exchange for signing the Lome Peace Accord, but Sankoh
soon went on to attack both government forces and UN peacekeepers and
the revived conflict was not declared over until more than two years
later.
LRH Position the "Mato Oput" Process
The LRA has also been heard from on the issue of peace and justice.
According to Reuters, on October 9, 2006, their spokesperson told
journalists in Juba that as long as the ICC indictment stands, no soldier is
going to come out of the bush. He added that "they should not expect us
to sign an agreement and later cage our leaders in The Hague; our leaders
are not fools."
2007]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Technical devices have also been suggested to square the circle
between justice and peace. Some Ugandan lawyers have proposed using
their traditional system of conflict resolution. There is a custom in
Uganda called "mato oput," which means "drinking the bitter root." This
requires perpetrators standing under a tree who admit their crimes to
show remorse and to ask the community and the victims for forgiveness.
These Ugandan lawyers want to have "mato oput" codified and formally
incorporated into Ugandan law. Then, if the LRA leaders undergo "mato
oput," the Ugandan Government would be in a position to tell the ICC
that Kony and his colleagues had been fully and fairly tried under
Ugandan law in a Ugandan court. And then the Ugandan lawyers
maintain that the Rome Statute's articles on complementarity could be
invoked and the ICC could of its own will drop its case against the
leaders of the LRA-a complicated procedure.
Escape Clauses in the Rome Statute
Other specialists and scholars have sought to get round the justice
versus peace issue in Uganda by invoking some escape-clause articles in
the Rome Statute itself. Under Article 16, for example, the UN Security
Council can place prosecutions on hold for a twelve-month renewable
period. Additionally, Article 53 of the Statute allows the ICC prosecutor
himself to suspend an investigation for cause. Be that as it may, both the
Court and the prosecutor have thus far been adamant in their insistence
on continuing the case against Kony and company.
Reporting to the Court's trial chamber on October 6, 2006,
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo struck a defiant note on the execution of his
warrants for arrest. He stated that commentators or representatives of
states are reported to have raised the possibility of withdrawing warrants
of arrest or granting an amnesty. But he went on to say that no state or
any other entity has sought withdrawal of the warrants. His submission
later noted that the arrest warrants have focused international attention on
the conflict and brought additional pressure on the LRA to engage
current peace negotiations.
The President of the ICC, Judge Philippe Kirsch, in his address to
the United Nations General Assembly on October 9, 2006 was more
circumspect than the prosecutor regarding the Uganda case. In an
indirect but clear reference to the controversy over the issue of
accountability versus immunity, which is raised by the amnesty issue,
Judge Kirsch said:
... the court is operating in circumstances of ongoing conflict. The
extent of the challenges facing the ICC is unlike anything
experienced by other courts or tribunals.
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That is where the matter stands for the moment.
Solution to the Impasse
Can a way be found out of this impasse? A number of preliminary
factors have to be taken into account before addressing the question.
First, the LRA leaders are likely to remain at large as none of the three
concerned countries, Uganda, Democratic Congo, Sudan, has shown
much disposition to arrest them and turn them over to the Court. Second,
the peace process remains quite fragile and the parties correctly accuse
each other of acting and negotiating in bad faith. And, finally, the
position of President Museveni in offering some kind of amnesty to the
LRA leaders has never been adequately explained by the Ugandans.
All crystal balls are cloudy when it comes to the Ugandan conflict
but, if I may hazard a guess, I should expect that if the Juba peace talks
show signs of serious, good faith progress towards ending the
insurgency, a way will be found to do so without immediately bringing
Kony and the others to justice in The Hague and without a formal grant
of amnesty to them. Creativity is as valued in diplomacy as it is in the
arts. It remains to be seen, however, what such a creative trial-avoiding
solution would mean for the ICC and its prosecutor over the long term.
Thank you very much.
(Applause.)
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Thank you very much. Now, we have
approximately 15 minutes for informal discussion, both amongst the
panel and from the audience here and remotely. Okay. Judge Goldstone.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: I'll just make one general point. I think it
must be conceded that justice can impede peace negotiations. One must
concede that in certain situations it may be more difficult to negotiate a
peace with a leader who fears being brought to trial. That can happen,
but it seems to me that it's the exception rather than the rule. But even
that cost I believe is worth the cost of having an efficient system of
international criminal justice. You can't win all the time and in human
affairs there's always a price to be paid for anything of value. You get
very little for nothing.
The evidence thus far is that peace and justice haven't clashed. In
the case of Karad~i6 and Mladi6, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations was infuriated when we issued an indictment against them
during the war. When I went to see him, he castigated me. He said how
can you do this, and he said in any event you should have consulted me.
I said to him and you would have told me not to issue it, and he said yes.
I said well, I'm very pleased that I considered it to be inconsistent with
my duties to consult you. I referred him to the Security Council Statute
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which gave me as Chief Prosecutor complete independence and said
expressly that the prosecutor may not take instructions from any
government or any other person, any other body. He said no, no. He
said that's why I didn't contact you. He said you should have contacted
me, which was a very unusual interpretation of that independence-what
independence means. Then he said and I can't understand why the
President of the Tribunal Judge Cassese didn't consult me. I said well,
frankly, I don't think it would have been appropriate, but in any event he
couldn't because I didn't consult him.
As Ambassador Okun implied, it was the indictment of KaradMi
that allowed Dayton to happen. If Karad~i6 hadn't been indicted, he
would have been entitled and free and would have gone to Dayton two
months after the massacre at Srebrenica and there's no way that the
Bosnian leaders would have entered the same room or sat at the same
table as Karadi. So there it aided the peace.
In the case of Milogevi6, again the UN and many NATO leaders
were infuriated when my successor Louise Arbour indicted Milo~evi6
during the 78 days of bombing. They said how can we expect our
negotiators Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former prime minister of Russia
representing the UN, and President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari,
representing the EU to be effective.
I had the privilege of interviewing both of them when I headed the
Kosovo Inquiry and both of them said they were horrified when
Milogevid was indicted. I said did it matter and they said no, to our
surprise Milogevi6 never raised it. It was never on the agenda. Why?
Politically, Milogevi6 wasn't such a great traveler and he felt secure at
home. As long as he remained in Belgrade, there was no way he was
going to end up in The Hague. Little did he anticipate a revolution in his
own country and the United States pressure impelling his successor to
hand him over. Again, it's an example of the importance of the United
States' political and economic pressure in having made that happen.
So it's a difficult question, but ultimately on the ICC incidentally, I
don't believe it's a prosecutor's job to make political calls. I don't think
that's what he or she is employed to do and I don't think he or she has
the information as to whether a peace negotiation is likely to succeed or
not. By peace, we're talking about enduring peace, not a cease fire. I
believe that the Rome Statute sensibly allows the Security Council to call
off or force suspensions of investigations.
If President Museveni feels that the indictment of Kony and the
other LRA people is impeding the peace, he should approach the
Security Council and give them convincing evidence that this is
impeding the peace. I have little doubt that all of the members of the
Security Council would be sympathetic to a good case being made on it.
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PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Ambassador Okun.
AMBASSADOR OKUN: I think that's true. On the question of the
trials not impeding peace, they may, but the results don't. I'd like to
reinforce what Judge Goldstone said about giving trials in affected
countries with one narrative. That's very important. Both blacks and
whites in South Africa understand what happened and it is an agreed
history. Ditto for Germany after World War II, as I mentioned, and
that's very important. It's also happening in the former Yugoslavia.
Except for the ultranationalists in the countries, and every country has
that bunch, it is now agreed what happened-above all in Serbia, which
was the principal instigator of the conflicts in Yugoslavia.
This, again, has implications for the long future. Countries need to
understand the truth for their long history. Remember after World War I
that it was widespread German anger that they had been badly treated in
the Versailles Treaty, (which they called the Versailles Diktat) that
allowed the rise of nationalist forces. One of Adolf Hitler's principal
arguments, was that his Nazi Party would undo an unfair treaty. These
trials of individual perpetrators also do away with the idea of collective
guilt because obviously not all of Germany was guilty, not all of Serbia
is guilty, not all of Uganda is guilty. Certain people are guilty. Certain
people-not entire countries-are guilty of war crimes and they have to
be tried and that's very important for the long-term future of both the
individual countries and of the relationship with their neighbors.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Professor Crane.
PROFESSOR CRANE: I think the Ambassador brings up a good
point related to alternates to justice. We need to begin to ask ourselves
when we move into areas of the world which appear to be suffering
under mass atrocity, and that is, is the justice we seek the justice they
want. In some cases, that may or may not be compatible. Certainly we
have to consider cultural alternatives to international justice at a certain
level and at a certain time because that's all part of the process. Peace
and justice all have to come together for some type of acceptable solution
for sustainable peace to begin.
Another note is that we have to be very careful. You may have
heard this trite phrase thrown around in the international community,
certainly in Africa, it certainly was prominent when I was in West
Africa, and that was African solutions to African problems. And being
an Africanist myself, I would respect that and certainly would encourage
that in many ways, but I'm finding at the international political level that
they're using that phrase in some ways to get around the obligations of
international norms. In other words, we have our problems, we have a
tragedy, let us Africans take care of it and in some ways try to carve an
exception to the international norms which all nations have signed up for,
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such as the Geneva Conventions. I think all 194 nations now have
signed up to do that.
Not all of the Protocols, but certainly to the basic Geneva
Conventions of 1949. So I think the Ambassador brings up an excellent
point related to alternate justice, which can also provide a peaceful
situation that some just solution can also be resolved.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Further questions, comments? Our
Carlisle contingent is invited to participate. If you raise your hand in
Carlisle if you have a question or a comment you want to make, I will
recognize you. Is there somebody in Carlisle? Okay. Please use your
microphone.
STUDENT: Okay. Can you hear me?
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Yes. Excellent.
STUDENT: Do you think charges should have proceeded only after
Kony was in custody and do you think it would be useful for the ICC to
have a police force to enforce the indictments that they do bring?
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: The prosecutors did keep the LRA
indictments under wraps. They were kept out of the public domain for
many months in the hope that they would be arrested during that period
when they wouldn't know that they had arrest warrants issued against
them. But when after some months that didn't work, the court felt
obliged to make them public. There was no point in going on. They
weren't going to get arrested and many people, NGOs in particular, were
asking what's going on. We want to know that some progress is being
made. So the politics of that situation dictated that the indictments
should be made public.
As far as a police force is concerned, forget about it. In the
foreseeable future, let alone my lifetime, in your lifetime there will never
be international police forces allowed to roam into the sovereign territory
of foreign states and frankly nor should there be. It has to work on the
basis of cooperation of sovereign states with international courts or
international organizations.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Anyone else want to comment further?
AMBASSADOR OKUN: I agree thoroughly. We have as a case in
point in the United Nations Charter which has very explicit Articles
about the creation of an international military force under the direction of
the Security Council. It has not happened in sixty years, and almost
certainly will not happen.
[Vol. 25:4
